Defence firms facing liberalization: innovation and export in an agent-based model of the defence industry by Blom, Martin et al.
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Defence firms facing liberalization:
innovation and export in an agent-based
model of the defence industry
Martin Blom and Fulvio Castellacci and Arne Fevolden
3. January 2012
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/35702/
MPRA Paper No. 35702, posted 3. January 2012 14:57 UTC
1 
 
 
Defence Firms Facing Liberalization: 
Innovation and Export in an Agent-based Model 
of the Defence Industry 
 
 
 
 
Martin Blom
*
, Fulvio Castellacci
#
 and Arne Fevolden
†
 
 
*
 University of Oslo 
# 
Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), Oslo  
† 
NIFU, Oslo 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: 3 January 2012 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The paper presents an agent-based simulation model of the defence industry. The 
model resembles some of the key characteristics of the European defence sector, and 
studies how firms in this market will respond to the challenges and opportunities 
provided by a higher degree of openness and liberalization in the future.  The 
simulation analysis points out that European defence firms will progressively become 
more efficient, less dependent on public procurement and innovation policy support, 
and more prone to knowledge sharing and inter-firm collaborations. This firm-level 
dynamics will in the long-run lead to an increase in the industry’s export propensity 
and a less concentrated market. 
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1. Introduction 
In the period from the end of the Cold War to the end of 1990s, several European 
countries have experienced a substantial decrease in their military budget and a 
significant loss of market shares vis-à-vis other international competitors. Defence 
firms and national authorities have reacted to these challenges by undertaking a 
process of restructuring and consolidation aimed at obtaining cost reductions through 
e.g. inter-firm collaborations, mergers and acquisitions. This process is currently 
coupled with the recent attempt of EU public authorities to introduce a greater degree 
of market liberalization in the future in order to avoid duplications and achieve 
stronger efficiency and international competitiveness in this market (Guay and Callum, 
2002). 
A recent EU Directive (The European Union’s Defence and Security Procurement 
Directive 2009/81/EC) intends to provide a new framework for policy interventions in 
the European defence market by limiting the extent of national protection, extending 
cooperation and cross-border trade within the EU and eventually introducing a higher 
degree of market liberalization (Edwards, 2011). This EU Directive will be 
implemented by national Member States starting in early 2012, although it will 
probably face resistance and take some time until it will lead to a more open and more 
competitive EU defence market.  
The future scenario of openness and liberalization does certainly represent an 
important change for firms in the European defence industry. How will defence 
companies respond to these new challenges and opportunities – will they be able to 
adjust their innovation and business strategies in order to be more competitive in 
international markets? And how will the impacts of market liberalization differ 
between large and smaller European countries? 
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Our investigation of these questions is rooted in the recent literature on firm 
heterogeneity and international trade, which has rapidly become the new paradigm in 
the international economics literature. This framework highlights the importance of 
firm-specific capabilities (e.g. productivity, innovative ability) to explain why, within 
each industry, some enterprises are able to export whereas others are not (Melitz, 
2003; Helpman et alia, 2004). 1  Companies respond differently to the process of 
market liberalization, and firm heterogeneity has therefore rapidly become the key 
pillar of these new theoretical structures. 
While broadly in line with this new strand of international economics literature, we 
make use of a different modeling approach to study the effects of market 
liberalization on the international activities of firms in the defence industry. Agent-
based models and simulations (ABMS) provide a framework to analyze a set of 
heterogenous agents and the interactions among them (North and Macal, 2007; Macal 
and North, 2010). This modeling approach is well suited to investigate heterogeneity 
and complexity as key features of physical, biological and social systems. Among 
several other fields, this theoretical framework has recently found an increasing 
number of applications within economics and business research, e.g. in the fields of 
computational and evolutionary economics (Tesfatsion, 2002; Frenken and Nuvolari, 
2004; Dosi et alia, 2010). To the best of our knowledge, however, the ABMS 
approach has not been used before to analyze the question of exporting firms’ reaction 
to market liberalization, and, more specifically, it has never been applied before 
within the context of the defence industry. 
A specific model of our interest is the so-called SKIN model (Simulating Knowledge 
Dynamics in Innovation Networks), introduced in a number of recent papers by 
                                                   
1 A survey of this new strand of models is presented by Castellacci (2011). 
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Gilbert et alia (2007), Pyka et alia (2007) and Ahrweiller et alia (2011). This is an 
agent-based model that provides an accurate analysis of private firms’ interactions 
and knowledge dynamics in high-tech (or knowledge intensive) industries. Our theory 
is rooted in this recent model and extends it further by applying it to the study of the 
defence sector, and shifting the focus to the relationship between innovation and 
export dynamics within a context of increasing market liberalization. While the main 
structure of our model follows the main basic pillars of the SKIN approach, our 
framework departs from it in some important ways, given the peculiarities and 
idiosyncrasies that characterize the defence industry.  
In the ABMS model presented in this paper, heterogeneous agents (defence firms) in a 
given country compete in the market by producing new products. In any period t, the 
agents will sort in three distinct groups: (1) successful innovators that meet the 
requirement for receiving public R&D funding; (2) successful innovators that do not 
qualify for public support; (3) unsuccessful performers, which will try to adjust their 
performance by undertaking a new privately-funded R&D project or by imitating 
external knowledge and searching a cooperation partner. 
The simulation analysis of this model points out that defence firms, when faced with a 
market liberalization scenario, will progressively become more efficient, less 
dependent on public procurement and innovation policy support, and more prone to 
knowledge sharing and inter-firm collaborations. This firm-level dynamics will in the 
long-run lead to an increase in the industry’s export propensity. Further, the effects of 
market liberalization will differ in large and smaller European economies. Large 
countries are likely to experience greater overall benefits, e.g. in terms of reduced 
market and export concentration, but the impacts of market liberalization on their 
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export propensity and international performance will take a longer time to realize its 
full potential.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 points out some key stylized facts that 
the model seeks to reproduce; section 3 presents the model; section 4 defines the firm-
level and industry-level variables used in the simulation analysis; section 5 presents 
the long-run properties and main outcomes of the model; section 6 discusses some 
alternative policy scenarios; and section 7 concludes by summarizing the key results 
and implications of the work. 
 
 
2. The defence industry: stylized facts 
The defence industry is in many respects a peculiar branch of the economy. In order 
to achieve a proper understanding of firms’ export activities in this sector, our model 
intends to resemble some of its key stylized facts and idiosyncrasies. 
 
Stylized fact 1: Firm heterogeneity: Defence firms are highly heterogenous. They 
produce in a number of distinct market segments – ranging from tactical 
communications and crypto solution to ammunitions and military explosives, from 
tents and protective suits to aircrafts, vehicles, vessels and submarines – and they are 
therefore characterized by a wide spectrum of technical competencies and product 
portfolios.2 In different market segments, large oligopolistic producers co-exist with 
smaller specialized suppliers of defence material and equipment (Markovski et alia, 
2010). 
                                                   
2 An accurate overview and classification of the different technological fields covered by firms in the 
defence industry is provided by the taxonomy developed by the European Defence Agency (EDA; see: 
http://www.eda.europa.eu).  
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Stylized fact 2: Stable and concentrated structure: The industry is typically 
characterized by a rather stable population of firms and little turbulence, and the entry 
and exit rates are much lower than in many other sectors. Most market segments are 
highly concentrated and characterized by an oligopolistic structure in which 
incumbents exploit their dominant position through high capital intensity and 
economies of scale and scope (Lichtenberg, 1995). The sector resembles closely the 
description of a Schumpeter Mark II type of innovation regime (Klepper, 1996; 
Malerba and Orsenigo, 1996). 
 
Stylized fact 3: High innovativeness: Technological innovation is as well-known a 
crucial ingredient in the production and commercialization of defence-related material. 
The industry is characterized by a very high share of enterprises with R&D activities 
(R&D propensity), and individual firms do on average spend a substantial amount of 
resources to develop new products and processes (R&D intensity). These 
technological activities are however characterized by a high degree of uncertainty and 
a long lag between the initial production of a new technology and its successful 
market commercialization (Lichtenberg, 1995; Mowery, 2010). Further, a substantial 
share of firms’ R&D activities is financed through public funding, due to their 
strategic importance in terms of military capabilities and national security. 
Collaborations between private firms and public scientific organizations are frequent 
and important. In short, it is reasonable to characterize the defence industry as a 
science-based sector (Pavitt, 1984). 
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Stylized fact 4: High export propensity: The industry has on average a high share of 
firms that sell their products abroad (export propensity). Differently from the very 
skewed size distribution that characterizes most manufacturing industries, where only 
a few large enterprises within each sector are able to export (Melitz, 2003), in the 
defence market it is often both large enterprises and smaller specialized suppliers that 
seek to compete in international markets through export activities (Castellacci and 
Fevolden, 2011). Their export success is not so much based on the price they set and 
the related terms of trade, but rather on the quality of the products and their degree of 
technological sophistication. In fact, the demand for defence equipment typically sets 
strong requirements in terms of the precision and reliability of the exported products. 
Accordingly, cooperation agreements and interactions between user and producers are 
extensive (Malerba and Montobbio, 2003). 
 
Stylized fact 5: Active public involvement: The defence industry plays a strategic 
role in terms of national military and security objectives, and it is for this reason 
heavily regulated and subject to an extensive and active public involvement. Public 
procurement, in particular, represents a traditional policy instrument through which 
defence authorities purchase a wide range of products and equipment from domestic 
firms. Public demand does therefore represent a stable and secure source of income 
for defence firms in a given country. International trade has also traditionally been 
actively regulated through so-called offset, counter-trade agreements and national 
favoritism (discrimination) such as the “buy-American act”, which impose restrictions 
to the amount and source of import and export activities (Markovski et alia, 2010). 
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Stylized fact 6: Towards increasing liberalization: From the end of the Cold War to 
the end of 1990s, many European countries experienced a substantial decrease in 
military budget and lost market shares vis-à-vis other international competitors. 
European defence firms and national authorities have reacted to this by undertaking a 
process of restructuring and consolidation aimed at obtaining cost reductions through 
e.g. greater cooperation, mergers and acquisitions. Further, EU public authorities are 
currently trying to introduce a greater degree of market liberalization in the future in 
order to avoid duplications and achieve stronger efficiency and international 
competitiveness in this market. The new EU Directive (2009/81/EC) mentioned above 
takes an explicit step in this direction (Guay and Callum, 2002; Edwards, 2011). 
Increased liberalization represents an important new scenario that European defence 
companies will soon be faced with. 
 
 
3. The model 
Agent-based models and simulations (ABMS) provide a framework to analyze a set of 
heterogenous agents and the interactions among them (North and Macal, 2007; Macal 
and North, 2010). This modeling approach is well suited to investigate heterogeneity 
and complexity as key features of physical, biological and social systems. Among 
several other fields, this theoretical framework has recently found an increasing 
number of applications within economics and business research, e.g. in the fields of 
computational and evolutionary economics (Tesfatsion, 2002; Frenken and Nuvolari, 
2004; Frenken, 2006; Dosi et alia, 2010). 
A specific model of our interest is the so-called SKIN model (Simulating Knowledge 
Dynamics in Innovation Networks), introduced in a number of recent papers by 
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Gilbert et alia (2007), Pyka et alia (2007) and Ahrweiller et alia (2011).3 This is an 
agent-based model that provides an accurate analysis of private firms’ interactions 
and knowledge dynamics in high-tech (or knowledge intensive) industries.  
Our paper is rooted in this recent model and extends it further by applying it to the 
study of the defence sector. While the main description of the model follows the main 
basic pillars of the SKIN approach, our model departs from it in some important ways, 
in the attempt to reproduce the peculiarities and idiosyncrasies that characterize the 
defence industry described in the previous section. Figure 1 presents a diagram 
describing the behavior of agents (private firms) and their market interactions within 
any given period t. 
 
< Figure 1 here > 
 
3.1 Agents 
Defence firms (business companies producing defence material, equipment and 
products) are the micro agents in the model. In line with our stylized fact 1 (firm 
heterogeneity), agents differ from each other in two main respects. First, they have 
different initial endowments of financial capital, which they use both for their 
productive and innovative activities. Large firms co-exist with SMEs in the defence 
market. Secondly, they differ in terms of their knowledge base, i.e. the pool of 
scientific and technological competencies and skills that the company employs in its 
innovative activities.4 The model represents the firm’s knowledge base as a set of 
units of knowledge. Each unit is a vector composed of three elements (or triple):  
                                                   
3  An extensive presentation of this approach along with a complete list of project activities and 
publications is available on the SKIN model’s website: http://cress.soc.surrey.ac.uk/skin/home. 
 
4 In the original version of the SKIN model, the knowledge base is labelled kene. 
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 The capability (C), which defines a domain or area within the defence industry 
(e.g. weapon production). It is represented in the model as a randomly chosen 
integer between 1 and 1000. 
 The ability (A), defining a specific ability or skill that the firm possesses in this C 
domain (e.g aerodynamic design technologies for platforms and weapons). It is a 
randomly chosen integer between 1 and 10. 
 The expertise (E), which indicates the level of expertise that the firm has in using 
the ability A. This is also represented as a randomly chosen number between 1 
(lowest) and 10 (highest). 
Defence firms compete in a highly innovative and technologically sophisticated 
environment (stylized fact 3). Our model assumes that all firms in the market actively 
use their knowledge base in the attempt to create new products and processes. 
Innovative activities are represented in the SKIN model in such a way that, at any 
period t, each company formulates an innovation hypothesis, i.e. an idea or a plan for 
developing a new product or process. The model represents this innovation hypothesis 
(IH) as a subset of the firm’s knowledge base, i.e. the enterprise focuses on a specific 
subset of its technological competence (capabilities, abilities, expertise) that it finds 
particularly promising and worth developing further. The subset of expertises (Ei) 
used in the innovation hypothesis are assumed to increase by one unit in the period, 
whereas those that are not used decrease by one unit (learning by doing and forgetting 
mechanisms). 
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3.2 Economic environment 
In any period t, each enterprise uses its innovation hypothesis to try to develop a new 
product. The outcomes of the innovative process are subject to a high degree of 
uncertainty and introduce an important stochastic element in the model. The new 
product is characterized as an index number that depends on the number of 
capabilities and abilities entailed in the innovation hypothesis according to the 
function: 
 
P = ( ∑ Ci ∙ Ai) mod N                                                                                                (1) 
 
where N is the maximum number of different products. The product is therefore 
characterized by the breadth of the innovation hypothesis, i.e. the number of different 
capabilities and abilities that the firm masters and it is able to combine in the 
development of the new artifact.  By contrast, the quality of the product depends on 
the depth of the innovation hypothesis, i.e. it is a function of the enterprise’s specific 
abilities and expertise. Specifically, product quality is defined as an index number 
obtained by multiplying the abilities and expertise levels for each of the vectors 
composing the innovation hypothesis and then normalizing the result. In other words, 
the key characteristic and value added of a new product does not depend on how 
broad the firm’s technological competence is, but rather how deep and specialized the 
company is in a specific sub-set or market niche. As explained below, this trade-off 
between competence breadth versus depth is an important characteristic driving the 
model’s outcomes. 
In order to produce the new product, the firm searches for inputs (e.g. capital 
equipment) in the market. The type of input it needs depends on the characteristics of 
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the product it wants to develop (P), and it eventually purchases the one with the 
lowest price and, ceteris paribus, the highest quality. If the enterprise does not find 
any input in the market at a price it can afford, it will not enter the production process. 
Once the product is ready for market commercialization, the firm sets its price by 
applying a mark-up (profit margin) over the total costs. Depending on the market 
demand available for this product, an adjustment mechanism tends to increase 
(decrease) its price over time if the demand level is high (low). 
More specifically, the model assumes that demand patterns differ for different 
segments of the defence industry. On the one hand, intermediate products are sold to 
other firms within the defence sector and their price is subject to the adjustment 
mechanism noted above. On the other hand, new products that are destined to the end 
users are always absorbed by the market. This assumption is in line with the fact that, 
in the defence industry, public procurement assumes a pivotal role, i.e. defence 
authorities typically purchase a substantial amount of new (or existing) defence 
products and material from domestic firms in order to secure military capabilities and 
so achieve national defence strategic objectives.  
Given these market interactions and outcomes, at any period t the firm achieves a 
certain level of profit – which is largely dependent on the characteristics and quality 
of the new product it sells. We further assume that if the enterprise’s profits are large 
enough to cover sunk export costs (i.e. above a given profit threshold), then the 
enterprise is able to start the commercialization of its product also to foreign markets. 
This is in line with the key idea of the recent literature on firm heterogeneity and 
international trade (e.g. Melitz, 2003; Helpman et alia, 2004), according to which only 
the most successful and productive enterprises within each sector are able to pay sunk 
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export costs and overcome trade barriers in international markets, whereas most other 
companies will only produce for the domestic market. 
 
3.3 Performance adjustment and feedback loops 
After having produced and commercialized its product, the firm looks at its current 
market performance (i.e. the profits it has realized at time t), and decides whether this 
is satisfactory or not, and how it can be improved in the future. The model’s 
parameter success threshold (defined in further details in section 4) indicates the 
profit level that marks the distinction between successful versus unsuccessful 
performance. This parameter is exogenously set at a given level for all firms in the 
market. For simplicity, we start by assuming that this success threshold corresponds to 
the mean profit level in the industry: enterprises whose profits are above (below) the 
industry-level mean will be satisfied (not satisfied) with their current performance.  
There are two ways in which an enterprise can improve its performance over time. 
One can only be pursued by successful innovators, whereas the other is followed by 
unsuccessful performers.  
 
New publicly-funded R&D projects: If a firm is satisfied with the profits it has 
realized, it may decide to apply for public funding for improving its product further 
(publicly-funded incremental innovation). Public defence authorities typically finance 
a substantial amount of domestic R&D activities through public procurement (stylized 
fact 5: Active public involvement). We assume that this public funding is granted to 
the applicant according to two complementary criteria: (1) The quality of the firm’s 
product has to be above a given product quality threshold; (2) The firm’s 
technological and competence breadth (i.e. the number of capabilities C in its 
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innovation hypothesis) has to be above a given competence breadth threshold. The 
intuition behind this public funding allocation mechanism is in line with the practice 
that public defence authorities typically follow. Put it simply, when policy-makers 
evaluate the possibility to finance a company to develop a new product, they look at 
both: (1) the quality of its current product, which gives them an indication of the 
likelihood that the firm will be able to produce a successful incremental innovation of 
it in the future; and (2) the breadth of the firm’s expertise in several different areas, 
since large multi-product and multi-competence enterprises are those that have 
presumably received public funding already in the past and thus previously developed 
a reliable user-producer relationship with public authorities. All in all, the possibility 
for successful firms to apply for new publicly-funded R&D projects introduce a 
source of cumulative causation in the model, since in any period t there will be a 
limited number of successful companies that will be able to qualify for public R&D 
support, which is likely to lead to further incremental innovation and satisfactory 
profits for them in the future. 
 
New privately-funded R&D projects and cooperation: If a firm is not satisfied 
with the profits it has realized, it will try to improve its performance by starting to 
search in a new direction (Nelson and Winter, 1982). An enterprise can apply two 
different search strategies to adjust its performance. (1) If its current product was sold 
in the market but the demand level was not sufficient to realize a satisfactory profit 
level, the company will undertake a new R&D project funded through its own internal 
resources (financial capital). The new R&D project will aim at improving one of the 
abilities (A) in its innovation hypothesis – or, put it differently, to achieve a better 
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specialization and technological sophistication in the technological space on which it 
is currently focusing (i.e. an increased technological depth, given its current breadth). 
(2) By contrast, if the firm’s current product did not meet any demand in the market 
(hence leading to negative profits), this gives a clear indication that the firm’s current 
innovation hypothesis is not well suited to the user requirements, and that it must be 
adjusted. The enterprise can do this by searching for an external partner for 
cooperation. The firm will first search among its previous partners, then its suppliers 
and users, by looking at the capability sets they possess as indicated by their 
respective innovation hypotheses and market product characteristics. When a firm 
finds a collaboration partner, it can add the partner’s innovation hypothesis triples to 
its own, thus achieving a broadening up of its capability set and knowledge base. Put 
it differently, cooperation enables the exchange of knowledge among different agents, 
and this is likely to improve the performance of these by augmenting their respective 
knowledge bases and technological competencies. All in all, the two strategies 
pursued by unsuccessful performers – privately-funded R&D and cooperation – 
introduce in the model a catch up mechanism, since firms lagging behind the 
technological frontier may improve their technological position and adjust their 
market performance by means of such R&D and imitation strategies. 
 
A summary and overview of the model (see figure 1) highlights the following two key 
features of this theoretical framework. First, in any period t, the agents will be sorted 
in three distinct groups: (1) successful innovators that qualify for public funding (see 
figure 1, loop 1); (2) successful innovators that do not meet the criteria for public 
support (loop 2); (3) unsuccessful performers, which will either undertake a new 
privately-funded R&D project or imitate by searching a cooperation partner (loop 3). 
16 
 
Secondly, the overall dynamics of the model, as shown in the next section, depends 
on the combination of two different mechanisms: (1) a cumulative causation 
mechanism according to which the best performers will tend to get public support and 
hence strengthen their market position even further in the future; (2) a catch up 
mechanism through which less successful companies will be able to adjust their 
performance and possibly achieve a leading market position in the future. Section 5 
will analyze how these mechanisms shape the long-run properties of the model, and 
section 6 will then investigate how future policy changes towards liberalization (see 
stylized fact 6) may shape export dynamics and market opportunities in the defence 
industry. 
 
 
4. Variables and indicators 
 
4.1 Key parameters: environmental and policy characteristics 
The following four parameters describe some key characteristics of the economic 
environment in which agents operate, which may be affected by policy actions and 
strategies over time. They represent the main explanatory variables of interest in our 
simulation analysis. 
 
Cooperation propensity: This defines the extent to which agents are willing (and 
able) to cooperate with others in the same market, i.e. their collaboration propensity. 
This parameter ranges on a continuous scale from 0,50 (lowest cooperation 
propensity) to 0 (highest propensity). 
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Success threshold: This indicates the threshold above (below) which firms consider 
themselves satisfied (not satisfied) with their current market performance (e.g. 
corresponding to the mean profit level in the industry). The parameter is defined in 
the profit space ranging from 0 to 12 000. This parameter is largely dependent on the 
extent and intensity of market competition, i.e. the success threshold is higher (lower) 
in a more (less) open and competitive market, because agents must compete with a 
greater (smaller) number of competitors (including foreign firms) in order to maintain 
their market position. In other words, in a more (less) open and competitive market 
companies tend to be more (less) demanding because they are aware they face a 
stronger (weaker) competition.  
 
Public funding requirement I: Product quality threshold: This is the first of the 
two criteria set by public authorities to grant public support to private defence firms. 
It ranges on a continuous scale defined on the quality domain between 0 (loose quality 
requirement, easy to get public funding) to 10 (strict quality requirement, difficult to 
get public support). 
 
Public funding requirement II: Competence breadth threshold: This is the second 
requirement for qualifying for public support. The parameter ranges on a continuous 
scale defined on the innovation hypothesis domain between 0 (narrow technological 
competence, easy to get public funding for most firms) to 10 (broad technological 
competence, difficult to get public support for many narrowly specialized companies). 
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4.2 Other model parameters  
These parameters do also represent environmental characteristics affecting the 
industry dynamics. However, they may not be influenced by policy actions in the 
short-run. We will not report the results of the simulation analysis for these variables 
in order to save some space (these are available upon request). 
 
Number of firms: Total number of enterprises in the market. 
 
Number of products: Total number of products that are sold in the market. 
 
Share of large firms: Number of large enterprises as a percentage of the total number 
of firms in the market. 
 
Share of end products firms: Number of enterprises that produce final products as a 
percentage of the total number of firms in the industry. 
 
4.3 Key aggregate (industry-level) outcomes 
The following six variables are aggregate outcomes of the model, i.e. emergent 
properties that are observed at the industry-level as the result of micro-level behavior 
and agents’ interactions. They represent the key variables defining the performance of 
the defence industry, and thus the main factors we seek to explain in our simulation 
analysis.  
 
Export propensity (%): Number of exporters as a share of the total number of firms 
in the industry. This is the variable typically highlighted by recent models of firm 
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heterogeneity and international trade (e.g. Melitz, 2003; Helpman et alia, 2004). As 
explained in the previous section, only firms that are above a given profitability level 
are assumed to be able to cover sunk export costs and export their products in foreign 
markets, whereas most other enterprises will continue to produce only for the 
domestic market. This is the main variable of interest in our simulation analysis, since 
it is typically used as an indicator of the export performance of an industry for a given 
country. 
 
Mean product quality: It is the industry-level average of the index measuring each 
firm’s product quality. 
 
New privately-funded R&D projects (%): Number of companies that undertake 
new privately-funded R&D projects as a percentage of the total number of firms. 
 
New publicly-funded R&D projects (%): Number of enterprises that qualify for 
publicly-funded R&D projects as a share of the total number of firms. 
 
Concentration index: We use the C5 concentration index, defined as the total 
financial capital owned by the five largest firms in the market as a share of the total 
financial capital in the defence industry. 
 
Export concentration ratio (%): We define this as the E5 export concentration 
index, i.e. the total value of export obtained by the five largest firms in the market as a 
percentage of the total value of export in the defence industry. 
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5. The long-run properties of the model 
We have carried out the following set of simulation exercises in order to analyze the 
long-run properties of the model. We have focused on the six key aggregate (industry-
level) outcome variables (listed in section 4.3), and investigated how each of them is 
affected in the long-run by variations in the set of the four explanatory variables (the 
key policy and environmental parameters listed in section 4.1). Specifically, for each 
explanatory variable, we have run a set of 200 simulations (each of which lasting for a 
300-period time horizon5) where the variable takes all possible values in its definition 
domain (from the minimum to the maximum). In each simulation, we have recorded 
the value of the six (industry-level) outcome variables at the end of the simulation run 
(t = 300), and then plotted on a two-dimensional graph the relationship between each 
explanatory variable and the resulting (long-run) value of each outcome variable. The 
results of this analysis are presented in figures 2 to 5. Each figure focuses on one 
explanatory factor and its relationships to the six aggregate outcome variables. These 
graphs point out the four main long-run properties of the model, which we briefly 
outline as follows. 
 
Result 1: A logistic relationship linking the cooperation propensity and the export 
propensity. 
 
The first panel of figure 2 shows this positive long-run relationship between the 
cooperation and the export propensity. The intuition behind this result is that when the 
cooperation propensity is very low, its effects on firms’ export activities are on 
average limited. Among the firms that register an unsatisfactory market performance, 
                                                   
5  We have decided to stop our simulation run at period 300 because the model dynamics gets 
remarkably stable from that period onwards.  
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only a small share of them are able to find an external partner for cooperation, so the 
overall extent of imitation and intra-industry knowledge spillovers is limited, and it 
does not affect substantially the export propensity of the industry. By contrast, above 
a certain threshold of the cooperation propensity parameter (< 0,30), unsuccessful 
firms are much better at exploiting external knowledge opportunities, and, thanks to 
the related spillovers effects, they may be able to catch up with the technological 
frontier in the industry and even export their products abroad. Put it differently, 
referring to the model flow chart previously presented in figure 1 (section 2), when 
the cooperation propensity increases over a certain threshold, a good number of 
unsuccessful firms (loop 3) are able to escape their “poverty trap” and enter one of the 
more virtuous circles (loops 1 and 2) that may lead them to export activities. 
This model dynamics is mirrored and further explained by the other panels of figure 2. 
An increase in the cooperation propensity parameter also leads to an increase of the 
industry’s product quality (as a result of this catch up dynamics), a smaller share of 
new privately-funded R&D projects and a larger share of publicly-funded R&D 
activities (since more firms are satisfied with their performance, and on average better 
at meeting the requirements for receiving public innovation support). Further, the last 
two panels of figure 2 show a decrease in the C5 industry concentration index (more 
firms catch up with the technological frontier and the market becomes less 
concentrated) and also a decrease in the E5 export concentration ratio (SMEs increase 
their export shares vis-à-vis large oligopolistic exporters, which worsen their 
international performance). 
This first result has an important policy interpretation and relevance. When a higher 
degree of liberalization will be introduced in the European defence market in the 
future – i.e. with the implementation of the new EU Directive by national Member 
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States – each national market will be characterized by a higher cooperation propensity, 
as defence firms will progressively become more aware of the external sources of 
technological opportunities available in an enlarged and more integrated economic 
environment and thus more prone to collaboration agreements and knowledge sharing. 
Therefore, this first result may be seen as an indication of how the export propensity 
in each national market will react in the long-run to this policy change and the shift 
towards liberalization. 
 
< Figure 2 here > 
 
Result 2:  An inverse U-shaped relationship between the success threshold and the 
export propensity. 
 
Figure 3 (first panel) illustrates this second result. When the success threshold is low, 
firms are on average satisfied with their market performance. To illustrate, if the 
industry is characterized by very low openness and competition intensity, domestic 
enterprises are arguably not too concerned about the threat of international 
competition, and are therefore likely to continue their business-as-usual activities 
without feeling too much pressure to become more productive or explore different 
technological trajectories. Under these conditions, the mean product quality in the 
industry is relatively low, and the firms are not under pressure to increase their 
product quality by means of cooperation and new privately-funded R&D projects 
(firms in loop 3) or publicly-funded projects (firms in loops 1 and 2). The export 
propensity in the industry is therefore low: the enterprises are relatively satisfied with 
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their domestic position and performance, and do not have the ambition and capability 
to sell their products abroad. 
However, as the market becomes more open and competitive, the success threshold 
increases and these outcome variables tend to respond positively: firms increase their 
private R&D efforts (loop 3), their product quality and their ability to attract public 
funding (loops 1 and 2). As a result, a larger number of firms will be able to achieve 
high profitability and export their products in international markets. 
Nevertheless, this type of dynamics will not continue indefinitely. After a certain limit 
(> 9000), the success threshold and market competition intensity will be so high that 
the enterprises will not be able to improve their performance any further. This 
happens when the entry of foreign productive firms into the domestic market makes it 
too hard for domestic enterprises to continue to produce. After this point, further 
increases in the success threshold (market competition) will therefore result in a 
stagnant product quality dynamics and a decrease in the industry’s export propensity. 
Similarly to the previous, this second result does also have a direct policy 
interpretation, since the progressive increase of our success threshold parameter 
simulates the possible effects of the introduction of a higher degree of market 
liberalization and competition in the future enlarged EU defence market. 
 
< Figure 3 here > 
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Result 3: A logistic relationship linking the product quality threshold (public funding 
requirement I) and the export propensity. 
 
Figure 4 reports this emergent property of the model. Although the shape of the 
logistic pattern identified by result 3 is analogous to the one pointed out for result 1, 
the underlying mechanism is different, since it focuses on the dynamics of public 
support rather than the effects of knowledge spillovers. Put it simply, when public 
defence authorities set a low quality threshold that firms have to satisfy in order to 
receive public R&D funding, this makes it easy for many defence companies to apply 
and get this type of policy support. This has two effects. The direct effect is of course 
that there is a large share of firms in the industry that are able to undertake new 
publicly-funded R&D projects (including both successful and less successful 
companies). The indirect effect, though, is that in such a generous and protected 
environment, less successful firms will not actively seek to increase their performance 
through product quality improvements, since public funding easily provides them 
with a mean to achieve their desired profit target. In this environment, the industry 
will tend to be more concentrated – successful firms outperform less successful 
enterprises – and the overall export propensity is on average low. 
However, if public authorities become more restrictive and set a higher quality 
threshold for allocating R&D funding, the indirect effect will progressively become 
stronger and counterbalance the direct effect. That is to say, even if a lower share of 
firms will be able to meet the requirements for attracting public funding, a greater 
number of firms will increasingly feel under pressure to adjust their performance 
through product quality improvements rather than public procurement, and for this 
reason the industry will progressively become less concentrated and more export-
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oriented. Here again, the policy interpretation of this result is clear: when the new EU 
Directive will gradually limit the extent of national protection and make domestic 
public procurement tenders more open to international competition, domestic firms 
will face the threat of foreign competition and will therefore have to invest more 
actively in technology and quality upgrades in order to maintain their competitive 
position. 
 
< Figure 4 here > 
 
Result 4: A flat linear relationship (weak correlation) between the competence 
breadth threshold (public funding requirement II) and the export propensity. 
 
The first panel of figure 5 shows this pattern. An increase in the competence breadth 
threshold, the second of the two criteria used by public authorities to allocate R&D 
grants, does not lead to any visible increase in the export propensity of the industry in 
the long-run. The reason for this is that in our model export activities and profits are 
mainly dependent on the quality of the product sold by the firm (technological depth) 
rather than the number of different capabilities mastered by the enterprise and used 
for the production of the new variety (technological or competence breadth). This 
implies that, when policy makers decide to make this second criterion more restrictive, 
they will start to allocate R&D funds mainly to large multi-product and multi-
competence enterprises, which already have a dominant position in the market. By 
contrast, it will become increasingly difficult for SMEs, specialized in more narrow 
industry segments and market niches, to meet this public funding requirement. The 
overall effect is that, differently from what pointed out for result 3, there will not be 
26 
 
any indirect effect counter-balancing the reduced number of publicly-funded R&D 
projects, i.e. defence firms will not start to invest more actively to upgrade their 
product quality, so that the industry’s mean quality and export propensity will on 
average not increase. This is explained by the fact that public authorities, by 
emphasizing competence breadth as the key criterion to apply for public R&D 
funding, do not give a clear and explicit signal to firms that they should actively 
improve their product quality, i.e. the funding allocation mechanism (competence 
breadth) is not in line with the key market requirement for achieving an 
internationally competitive position (technological depth).  
For this fourth result too, the policy interpretation and implication is quite explicit. 
Undertaking a process of reform towards market liberalization, national defence 
authorities will progressively have to make the criteria to allocate public R&D support 
more restrictive and demanding, since foreign firms will also be gradually invited to 
participate in public procurement tenders (as the new EU Directive indicates). If 
policy-makers will decide to increase public allocations mainly for large multi-
product and multi-competence enterprises, this will tend to make these oligopolistic 
producers stronger and more competitive but will not lead to any increase in the 
number of exporting firms in the industry (result 4). By contrast, if the authorities 
decide to emphasize the first allocation criterion (product quality), this will have a 
visible effect and act to increase the industry’s mean quality and export propensity 
(result 3). 
 
< Figure 5 here > 
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6. Simulation of different policy scenarios for EU countries 
This section makes use of these four long-run properties of the model to analyze and 
compare six different policy scenarios. The exercise is intended to compare the 
current situation – in which the European defence industry is characterized by a high 
level of national protection and a low degree of market liberalization – with five 
possible future scenarios, which will be realized when public defence authorities in 
European countries will start to implement the new EU Directive and thus introduce a 
stronger degree of openness and liberalization in this market. 
The current scenario is obtained by calibrating the model in order to fit the dynamics 
of an industry with an export propensity between 35 and 40%, which corresponds on 
average to the real percentage of exporting firms in national defence markets in 
Europe. Specifically, we present two versions of our calibration exercise, one for a 
small country (e.g. Sweden, Netherlands, Norway) and the other for a large economy 
(e.g. France, Germany, UK). The small country version has 150 defence enterprises, 
60 products and an average export intensity of 50% (i.e. we reasonably assume that in 
a small domestic market exporting firms do on average sell a substantial share of their 
defence products abroad). The large country version has instead 500 enterprises, 400 
products and a 10% mean export intensity (i.e. if the domestic market is large, 
exporting firms sell on average a greater share of their products at home and a smaller 
share abroad). 
The specific values that we have used to calibrate these three parameters (number of 
firms, number of products and export intensity) are purely indicative and do not 
correspond to real data for the defence industry in European countries (which are not 
available). The idea is to set up a stylized and simple comparison between a large and 
a small national defence market, and see whether and the extent to which these 
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country-specific differences affect the outcomes of the model. It is important to notice, 
however, that the results described below do not depend on the specific parameter 
setting that we have used to calibrate the large- and small-country cases, but are 
general and hold also for different configurations of the parameters set that we have 
experimented with. 
After setting up the current scenario, we have then constructed five future scenarios 
that represent different possible trajectories that the industry may follow in the future 
as a result of different policy strategies in terms of the implementation of the new EU 
Directive. These five scenarios differ in terms of how rapidly and actively defence 
authorities of national Member States will decide to implement the new Directive and 
introduce market liberalization, i.e. the typology goes from a softer and more gradual 
implementation towards a more rapid and radical market reform. 
(1) Higher success threshold scenario: This represents a situation in which national 
policy-makers of, say, country X do not introduce any significant and active reform 
towards liberalization. However, the increased openness of other EU countries’ 
defence sectors naturally induces a stronger degree of competition in country X’s 
domestic market. Faced with the challenge posed by the entry of other European firms 
into the domestic market, country X’s enterprises will react by adjusting their success 
threshold upward. 
(2) Higher cooperation scenario: If national defence authorities introduce measures 
aimed at promoting inter-firm collaborations (within and across countries), defence 
firms will tend to increase their cooperation propensity and, hence, their ability to 
exploit knowledge spillovers effects. 
(3) Higher product quality threshold scenario: Policy-makers may also decide to 
change public procurement mechanisms and modify the criteria they use to allocate 
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public R&D funds to defence companies. This may be a natural consequence of the 
fact that foreign EU enterprises will be allowed to participate in national public 
procurement tenders, thus making these much more competitive and demanding for 
domestic firms. In particular, if national authorities decide to emphasize the first 
allocation criterion, they will increase the product quality threshold that firms have to 
satisfy in order to qualify for public support.  
(4) Increased competence breadth threshold scenario: By contrast, if they decide to 
focus on the second allocation criterion, they will increase the competence breadth 
threshold, and hence start to allocate more funds to large multi-product and multi-
competence firms and fewer resources to smaller specialized suppliers. 
(5) Market liberalization scenario: Finally, if all the policy strategies indicated by the 
previous four scenarios are combined and implemented together, we obtain a full 
market liberalization scenario. This may be thought of as the most rapid and most 
radical way of introducing market liberalization in the defence industry. 
Figure 6 reports the results of the policy simulation analysis. Each panel of the figure 
focuses on one of the six industry-level outcome variables, for the small- and large-
country versions of the model respectively. In each graph, we report the time path of a 
given variable for the six different scenarios outlined above and for a 150-run period.6  
The first panel of figure 6 focuses on the dynamics of export propensity in the defence 
industry. The current scenario shows the basic working of the model. Over time, 
firms tend to learn and improve their technological performance by means of learning 
by doing, cooperation and R&D activities, so that the number of exporters in the 
industry does gradually increase as time goes by. Correspondingly, the other graphs 
                                                   
6 We have repeated each exercise for a total of 20 replications in order to make sure that our results are 
robust to the presence of stochastic shocks related to R&D activities and outcomes. Each point reported 
in the various graphs in panel 6 is the average of these Monte Carlo replications. 
30 
 
indicate that in this basic scenario the mean product quality in the industry will 
increase over time, the number of firms receiving public funding will increase, and 
the concentration level will therefore decrease. However, a comparison between the 
current scenario and the other five shows that the former is the one characterized by 
the worst performance in the long-run (i.e. lowest product quality and export 
propensity at t = 150). Specifically, we observe the following five patterns.  
(1) In the higher success threshold scenario, companies are on average more 
responsive to market opportunities and more actively investing in product quality and 
technology upgrading vis-à-vis what they tend to do in the current scenario (for the 
reasons explained in result 2, see section 5). This second scenario is therefore 
characterized by a more rapid increase of export propensity over time, which 
eventually stabilizes at a value around 40%. This is also the scenario where firms 
undertake the greatest number of new privately-funded R&D projects in order to 
adjust and improve their technological performance. A comparison of the small- and 
large-country versions of the model indicates that the main difference is in terms of 
the two concentration indexes (see last two panels of figure 6). The decrease in the C5 
and E5 concentration indexes over time is much stronger in a large country than in a 
small economy. 
(2) The higher cooperation scenario is the one where defence firms, due to their 
higher collaboration propensity, exploit more actively the opportunities provided by 
external learning and knowledge spillovers effects (see result 1). This explains why 
this scenario outperforms the current one leading to a much higher export propensity 
(around 50%). Due to the strength of this imitation-based catch up mechanism, a 
substantially number of firms are able to attract public funding for carrying out R&D 
activities. Many of these SMEs and catching up enterprises are also able to start to 
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export their products abroad, so that the E5 export concentration ratio decreases 
significantly over time (for the large country the decrease is visibly more pronounced 
than for the small-country). 
(3) The higher product quality threshold scenario also leads to a higher export 
propensity in the long-run (between 40 and 45%) and a lower market and export 
concentration. Differently from the previous, though, in this policy scenario 
enterprises are able to strengthen their market position over time despite the fact that 
public funding opportunities decrease (result 3). The increase in the export propensity 
and the decrease in the market and export concentration are stronger in the large- than 
the small-country version of the model. The reason is that the competition and 
selection mechanisms triggered by product quality enhancing investments are 
magnified and arguably have stronger effects in a large market than in a small 
economy. 
(4) The increased competence breadth threshold scenario does not lead to any 
substantial change as compared to the current scenario. This is because, as pointed out 
by result 4 (section 5), this second public funds allocation mechanism (technological 
breadth) is not aligned with the crucial market requirement for competing in 
international markets (technological depth). Hence, this will end up by strengthening 
the leading position of large oligopolistic producers but will not increase export 
opportunities for most other SMEs in the market. In this scenario, no main difference 
emerges between the large- and small-country simulations. 
(5) Finally, the market liberalization scenario clearly outperforms all other policy 
strategies considered in figure 6, since this is obtained by combining together all four 
previous scenarios, representing the possibility that national defence authorities will 
opt for a rapid and radical reform of the defence market towards openness and full 
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liberalization. This would lead, according to this model, to a substantial increase in 
the number of exporting firms and a more competitive and less concentrated market in 
the long-run. It is also interesting to note that the effects of full market liberalization 
on export propensity are more rapid in the small-country version of the model, 
whereas in the large-economy version the market liberalization scenario takes a 
substantially longer time (between 50 and 100 runs) before overtaking the others. 
We conclude our simulation analysis by presenting the results of one final exercise 
that is useful to summarize and highlight one key fact outlined by this model. Table 1 
presents the results of four panel data regressions that point out the statistical 
relationship between firms’ performance (profits and export participation), on the one 
hand, and technological breadth and depth, on the other. The regressions are run on 
the set of simulated data produced by two of our model’s scenarios: the current one 
and the market liberalization scenario. These are firm-level panel dataset (150 firms 
for a 200-period time span) obtained from our small-country model calibration. We 
make use of panel fixed effects estimators to analyze this reduced-form relationship 
that characterizes agents’ behavior in our model.  
The results, as shown in table 1, are in line with the main intuition already discussed 
along the paper. In both scenarios, firms’ performance is positively and significantly 
related to their product quality, and negatively linked to the length of their innovation 
hypothesis. In other words, the model points out the existence of a trade-off between 
technological breadth and depth: it is the latter factor that makes firms internationally 
competitive in a given industry segment or market niche. If policy makers aim at 
increasing the export propensity of the industry, it is product quality, and not firm size 
or competence breadth, the key firm-level factor they should target and try to foster. 
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< Figure 6 and table 1 here > 
 
 
7. Conclusions  
The paper has presented an agent-based simulation model of the defence industry. 
The model is set up in such a way that it resembles some of the key stylized facts and 
idiosyncrasies of the defence sector, and studies how this may react when a higher 
degree of openness and liberalization will be introduced in this market. In particular, 
the exercise is valuable and timely in a European context, given that the new EU 
Directive (2009/81/EC) has recently introduced a new policy framework that will 
gradually lead to a progressive liberalization of the defence market. It is therefore 
important to investigate how micro-level agents (defence firms) in each domestic 
market will respond to these new challenges and opportunities. The results of the 
simulation analysis of this model highlight four main results and implications. 
First, as the EU defence sector will gradually become more open and integrated, firms 
in each national market will start to adjust their own performance criteria and 
expectations upward, i.e. their success threshold will increase as the industry becomes 
more open and competitive. This external environmental pressure will induce firms to 
invest more actively in technology and product quality upgrading, thus increasing the 
overall industry performance and export propensity in the long-run. This is likely to 
happen, according to our model, even in the absence of explicit actions of national 
policy-makers intended to introduce reforms towards market liberalization in their 
respective country. 
Secondly, if national defence authorities will instead decide to undertake a more 
active strategy, e.g. by introducing schemes intended to foster inter-firm 
34 
 
collaborations (within and across countries), this will substantially improve the 
performance of the industry. Defence enterprises will become more prone and better 
able to exploit the opportunities provided by external learning and knowledge 
spillovers, and this will eventually lead to a higher product quality and export 
propensity in the industry. 
Thirdly, national policy-makers may also contemplate the possibility to change public 
procurement rules and revise some of the criteria they use to allocate R&D support to 
private firms. The new EU Directive does in fact intend to introduce a higher degree 
of openness in public procurement tenders, by allowing other foreign (EU) firms to 
participate in the public procurement tenders announced by a given national Member 
State. If national policy makers will allow for this, they will inevitably have to revise 
their public funding allocation criteria making them more restrictive. They may do 
that in two different ways. They may either increase the product quality threshold that 
the applicant firms have to satisfy (which depends on the degree of specialization or 
depth that the firm has in a specific industry segment), or increase the minimum 
competence breadth that the applicant must have (which is directly related to the 
firm’s size). Our model shows that emphasizing the first criterion will lead to a 
substantial improvement in the industry’s performance in the long-run, whereas the 
second will not. The reason for this is that the first criterion provides defence firms 
with a clear signal that product quality is the key factor to compete in international 
markets (more firms will then become exporters), while the second tends to 
concentrate public R&D funding opportunities in the hands of a limited number of 
large oligopolistic enterprises. In this way, these dominant enterprises will arguably 
strengthen their international position, but the total number of exporting firms in the 
industry (export propensity) will stay the same. 
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Finally, our simulation results indicate that the effects of market liberalization in this 
sector will differ in large and smaller European economies. On the one hand, large 
countries are likely to experience greater overall benefits in terms of reduced market 
and export concentration, due to the fact that the catching up, competition and 
selection dynamics of the model are magnified in the presence of a larger and more 
populated market. On the other hand, however, the positive effects of market 
liberalization unfold more rapidly in a small economy and more slowly in a larger 
country. The policy implication of this fourth result, in our view, is that large 
European countries should take the lead in the implementation of the new EU 
Directive and pursue a more active and more rapid process of market liberalization 
than small European countries. 
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Figure 1: Model flowchart 
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Figure 2: Effects of an increase in the cooperation propensity (X-axis) on the six 
industry-level outcome variables (Y-axis). 
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Figure 3: Effects of an increase in the success threshold (X-axis) on the six industry-
level outcome variables (Y-axis). 
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Figure 4: Effects of an increase in the product quality threshold (public funding 
requirement I, X-axis) on the six industry-level outcome variables (Y-axis). 
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Figure 5: Effects of an increase in the competence breadth threshold (public funding 
requirement II, X-axis) on the six industry-level outcome variables (Y-axis). 
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Figure 6: Simulating six different policy scenarios 
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Time path of product quality 
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Time path of new privately-funded R&D projects (%) 
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Time path of new publicly-funded R&D projects (%) 
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Time path of the concentration index (C5) 
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Time path of the export concentration ratio E5 (%) 
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Table 1: Regression results: firms’ profits and export activities as a function of their 
product quality (technological depth) and innovation hypothesis length (competence 
breadth) – Panel fixed effects estimations (FE) on the simulated firm-level dataset 
 
 
 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 
Scenario 
 
 
Current 
 
 
Market 
liberalization 
 
 
Current 
 
 
Market 
liberalization 
 
Estimation method 
 
Linear FE 
 
 
Linear FE 
 
 
Probit FE 
 
 
Probit FE 
 
 
Dependent variable 
 
 
Profits 
 
 
Profits 
 
 
Export dummy 
 
 
Export dummy 
 
 
Product quality 
(technological depth) 
 
3484.86 
(21.32)*** 
 
2820.03 
(38.5)*** 
 
0.9452 
(20.41)*** 
 
0.8780 
(53.50)*** 
 
IH length  
(technological breadth) 
 
-1960.12 
(-20.19)*** 
 
-905.45 
(-20.84)*** 
 
-0.1382 
(-6.60)*** 
 
-0.0346 
(-4.67)*** 
 
Year 
 
 
10.95 
(7.88)*** 
 
 
-4.46 
(-2.60)*** 
 
 
0.0055 
(16.11)*** 
 
 
0.0023 
(7.74)*** 
 
 
Observations 
 
 
30150 
 
 
30150 
 
 
26130 
 
 
29547 
 
 
The regressions include a constant. Significance levels: ***: 1%. 
 
 
